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REVERSING THE PERVERSION: INTERPRETING ERISA TO 
PROTECT EMPLOYEES WHO REPORT VIOLATIONS OF 
FEDERAL LAW TO THEIR MANAGERS 
ABSTRACT 
Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) to protect workers’ retirement savings from mismanagement and 
misuse. Section 510 of ERISA makes it unlawful for any individual to interfere 
with a person who attempts to enforce her rights under ERISA. Section 510 
also contains an antiretaliation provision, which protects employees who 
report potential ERISA violations by imposing civil penalties on employers that 
commit an adverse employment action against an employee in retaliation for 
making such a report. 
Courts are divided as to whether informal, unsolicited complaints to 
management are protected by section 510’s antiretaliation provision. The 
courts holding that these types of complaints are within section 510’s scope 
have largely ignored the provision’s plain text and focused their analyses on 
congressional purpose and intent. Courts holding the opposite have focused 
solely on the provision’s plain text, largely ignoring congressional purpose 
and intent. Both approaches have been incomplete and inadequate from a 
statutory-interpretation perspective and have created perverse incentives for 
both employers and employees that frustrate the overarching goal of ERISA: to 
provide security for workers’ benefits while minimizing the administrative 
burden on employers. 
This Comment proposes an interpretation of section 510 that is faithful 
both to the plain text of the statute and to congressional purpose and intent. 
This interpretation protects employees who make unsolicited, informal 
complaints to management about potential ERISA violations. It is superior to 
existing judicial approaches on two different levels: (1) as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, it best represents a synthesis of the textual method of 
interpretation with legislative purpose and intent; and (2) as a practical 
matter, it avoids perverse incentives that have frustrated the goals of ERISA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Shirley Edwards was the human resources director at A.H. Cornell & Son, 
Inc., a family-owned business that provides commercial and residential 
construction services.1 As part of her job, Edwards administered the 
company’s employee benefit plans.2 During the course of her employment, 
Edwards allegedly discovered several violations of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).3 Edwards believed that her supervisor, 
Melissa Closterman, who was in charge of the day-to-day operations of the 
company, had implemented a scheme to save the company money at the 
expense of its employees by discouraging employees from participating in the 
company’s group health insurance plan.4 Specifically, Edwards alleged that 
Closterman was intentionally overstating the amount employees would have to 
contribute to participate in the plan and was withholding information from the 
company’s employees about the benefits the plan provided.5 
Upon discovering these potential ERISA violations, Edwards claimed that 
she approached Closterman and Scott Cornell, one of the company’s 
executives, and told them “she ‘objected to participating in a scheme to 
commit criminal fraud as to Defendants’ disability insurance carrier, worker’s 
compensation insurance carrier, and health insurance carrier.’”6 Edwards was 
fired shortly after.7 
Edwards filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania for unlawful retaliation in violation of section 510 of 
ERISA.8 The district court held that section 5109 did not reach unsolicited, 
informal complaints to management concerning ERISA violations, such as the 
concerns Edwards expressed to Closterman and Cornell.10 On appeal, the Third 
 
 1 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 218 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 
(2011). 
 2 See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., No. 09-cv-1184, 2009 WL 2215074, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 
2009), aff’d, 610 F.3d 217, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Id. 
 5 First Amended Civil Action Complaint at 5, Edwards, 2009 WL 2215074 (No. 09-cv-1184). 
 6 Edwards, 2009 WL 2215074, at *1. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. at *2. 
 9 This Comment uses section 510 generally to refer only to the antiretaliation provision of section 510, 
see Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub L. No. 93-406, § 510, 88 Stat. 829, 895 (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006)), unless otherwise noted. 
 10 Edwards, 2009 WL 2215074, at *4. 
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Circuit affirmed.11 Ms. Edwards was out of a job and without a remedy under 
federal law. 
Had Edwards lived and worked in Texas or California, however, the federal 
courts would have allowed her to proceed with her action under federal law.12 
The circuit courts of appeals are divided as to whether unsolicited, informal 
complaints to management concerning potential ERISA violations fall within 
the scope of section 510.13 In spite of this long-standing circuit split, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue. The academic literature is similarly 
sparse in terms of analyses of the scope of section 510. Although several 
commentators have discussed the circuit split that is the subject of this 
Comment, these commentators have largely focused on describing the various 
methods of statutory interpretation courts have used to interpret section 510,14 
or have proposed legislative solutions to broaden the scope of section 510.15 
 
 11 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 225–26 (2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 
(2011). 
 12 See infra Part II.A. 
 13 See infra Part II. 
 14 See, e.g., Malena Kinsman, Comment, Can You Hear Me? Will the Diminishing Scope of ERISA’s 
Anti-Retaliation Provision Drown the Cries of Whistleblowers?, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 685 (2011) 
(summarizing the circuit split and discussing the method of statutory interpretation used by each circuit); 
Michael C. Ross, Comment, Blow the Whistle at Your Own Risk: ERISA’s Retaliation Provision and the 
Dilemma of the “Unsolicited Internal Complaint,” 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 331 (2011) (summarizing the circuit 
split, discussing the method of statutory interpretation used by each circuit, and analyzing the current 
composition of the U.S. Supreme Court to determine how it might decide the scope of section 510). 
 15 See, e.g., Adam B. Gartner, Note, Protecting the ERISA Whistleblower: The Reach of Section 510 of 
ERISA, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 235 (2011) (analyzing the circuit split and proposing an amendment to section 
510); Erik Rome, Note, Recognizing Those Left Unprotected by ERISA’s Section 510 Loophole: Congress 
Must Act to Protect These Employees, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 194 (2011) (same). One commentator has 
taken a different approach. See Jessica Barclay-Strobel, Comment, Shooting the Messenger: How Enforcement 
of FLSA and ERISA Is Thwarted by Courts’ Interpretations of the Statutes’ Antiretaliation and Remedies 
Provisions, 58 UCLA L. REV. 521 (2010). Barclay-Strobel proposes a broad interpretation of the antiretaliation 
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and “argues that an expansion of FLSA will lead to a 
similar expansion of ERISA.” Id. at 527. Fundamentally, Barclay-Strobel assumes that judicial interpretations 
of the antiretaliation provision of the FLSA will inform judicial interpretations of section 510. See id. (“Given 
that courts rely on their circuit’s interpretation of FLSA’s antiretaliation provision to inform the scope of 
ERISA’s provision, a resolution of the FLSA circuit split will lead to the same result under ERISA.”). This 
assumption ignores the reality that none of the circuits that have decided the scope of section 510, except the 
Fourth Circuit, have relied on their circuit’s interpretation of the FLSA. See infra Part II. In fact, the Third 
Circuit has explicitly rejected Barclay-Strobel’s assumption. See Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225 (“[T]he conclusion 
that internal complaints are protected under the FLSA does not require a parallel conclusion under ERISA’s 
distinct statutory language.”). It also fails to account for textual differences between section 510 and the 
antiretaliation provision of the FLSA, and for the fact that circuit courts of appeals have reached different 
conclusions as to whether section 510 or the antiretaliation provision of the FLSA is broader. Compare 
Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 328 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (rejecting the district court’s 
analysis interpreting the scope of section 510 by relying on circuit precedent interpreting the scope of the 
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This Comment provides a roadmap for courts to follow to interpret section 
510, as it exists now, to encompass unsolicited, informal complaints to 
management concerning potential ERISA violations. Part I explains in broad 
terms the purpose of ERISA and how section 510 fits into ERISA’s regulatory 
framework. Part II explains judicial treatment of section 510 and details the 
shortcomings of existing attempts to interpret its scope. Part III proposes an 
interpretation of section 510 that is faithful to both the statutory text and 
congressional intent and purpose. Part IV discusses the practical implications 
of a broad reading of the scope of section 510 and argues in favor of adopting 
such an interpretation. 
I. ERISA: AN OVERVIEW 
This Part provides an overview of ERISA and explains some of its 
enforcement provisions, including section 510. It also discusses the substantive 
law governing retaliation claims under ERISA and illustrates the importance of 
defining what types of activities section 510 protects. 
Congress enacted ERISA to protect “the interests of participants in 
employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries” and to “provid[e] for 
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts” to 
correct interference with those interests.16 To accomplish this objective, 
ERISA imposes three types of regulations for all covered employee benefits 
plans: (1) reporting and disclosure requirements with respect to a plan’s terms 
and finances,17 (2) standards of conduct for a plan’s fiduciaries,18 and (3) 
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts to enforce ERISA’s provisions.19 In 
addition to these basic requirements that apply to all covered employee 
benefits plans, ERISA imposes additional requirements upon employers with 
respect to pension plans and defined benefit plans.20 These regulations include 
 
FLSA, because section 510 “is unambiguously broader in scope than [the antiretaliation provision] of FLSA”), 
with Edwards, 610 F.3d at 224–25 (suggesting the scope of section 510 is actually narrower than the scope of 
the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision). This Comment argues in favor of a broad interpretation of section 510 
without regard to how the circuit split concerning the scope of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision is resolved. 
See infra Part III. 
 16 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006). 
 17 PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 12 (2010) (citing 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1021–1031). 
 18 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a), 1104, 1106). 
 19 Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1144). 
 20 Id. at 12–13. An “employee benefit plan” is a “pension plan” if it “provides retirement income to 
employees, or . . . results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of 
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limitations on age and service conditions of plan membership;21 restrictions on 
terms of the plans;22 and, in the case of defined benefit plans, minimum benefit 
accrual rates,23 minimum funding requirements,24 insurance requirements,25 
and restrictions on plan termination.26 At the same time Congress passed 
ERISA, Congress also modified the Internal Revenue Code to grant certain tax 
benefits to members of various types of employee benefits plans.27 
ERISA contains an enforcement provision that creates a cause of action for 
employees who are wrongfully terminated or face other types of adverse 
employment actions “taken to discourage or prevent them from gaining or 
asserting rights under an employee benefit plan.”28 This provision is found in 
section 510, which states in relevant part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, 
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary 
for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of 
an employee benefit plan . . . or for the purpose of interfering with 
the attainment of any right to which such participant may become 
entitled under the plan.29 
For example, an employee who is terminated because her pension benefits are 
about to vest has a federal cause of action against her employer under section 
510.30 
In this regard, ERISA creates a cause of action for employees similar to 
that created by numerous other federal statutes that prohibit employers from 
 
covered employment or beyond.” 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). A “defined benefit plan” is any type of “pension 
plan other than an individual account plan [or defined contribution plan].” Id. § 1002(35). The terms 
“individual account plan” and “defined contribution plan” are used interchangeably and refer to “a pension 
plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the 
amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any 
forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to such participant’s account.” Id. 
§ 1002(34). 
 21 29 U.S.C. § 1052(a)(1)(A). 
 22 Id. §§ 1053, 1055, 1056(d)(1), (d)(3). 
 23 Id. § 1054. 
 24 Id. §§ 1081(a)(8), 1082–1085. 
 25 Id. §§ 1321–1323. 
 26 Id. § 1341. 
 27 26 U.S.C. §§ 4971–4980G. 
 28 WIEDENBECK, supra note 17, at 171. 
 29 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 30 See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 612 (1993) (“We do not mean to suggest that an 
employer lawfully could fire an employee in order to prevent his pension benefits from vesting. Such conduct 
is actionable under § 510 of ERISA . . . .”). 
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discriminating against their employees.31 In many ways, this provision is an 
extremely important part of ERISA’s regulatory scheme because, without it, 
employees who attempt to assert their rights under ERISA would be vulnerable 
to any adverse employment action their employers choose to take against 
them.32 In fact, it has been noted that section 510 “is the linchpin of the whole 
matrix of federal pension and welfare benefit protections.”33 
Like other antidiscrimination statutes,34 ERISA contains a provision to 
protect employees who report violations of federal law from retaliation by their 
employers.35 It states, “It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, 
suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he has given 
information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding 
relating to this chapter.”36 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under 
ERISA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she participated in an activity that 
ERISA protects, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there 
is a causal link between her participation in the protected activity and the 
adverse employment action she suffered.37 If the plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show there was a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.38 If 
the employer meets this burden, the plaintiff can only prevail if she proves the 
stated reason is merely a pretext for prohibited discrimination.39 However, if 
 
 31 The most well-known of the antidiscrimination statutes is undoubtedly Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e-17. Title VII creates a cause of action for employees who face an 
adverse employment action because of the employee’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(1). Other well-known antidiscrimination statutes include the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (ADEA), which makes it unlawful for certain employers to discriminate against some employees 
because of an employee’s age, 29 U.S.C. § 623, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which, 
among other things, makes it unlawful for certain employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of 
an employee’s disability, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006 & Supp. II 2009). 
 32 WIEDENBECK, supra note 17, at 171–72. 
 33 Id. at 171. 
 34 The antiretaliation provision of Title VII is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), the antiretaliation 
provision of the ADEA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), and the antiretaliation provision of the ADA is 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12203. 
 35 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Hamilton v. Starcom Mediavest Grp., Inc., 522 F.3d 623, 628 (6th Cir. 2008). The elements of the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliation under ERISA are borrowed from and substantially the same as the 
elements of the plaintiff’s prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. See Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. 
Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating the three elements of a plaintiff’s prima facie case of 
retaliation under Title VII). 
 38 Manning v. Am. Republic Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 1030, 1042 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 39 Id. 
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the plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the 
plaintiff’s claim cannot survive summary judgment.40 
In light of this framework, defining what types of activities are protected 
for the purposes of section 510 becomes critically important. Indeed, how 
broadly or narrowly protected activity is defined has the potential to determine 
directly whether the plaintiff’s claim can survive summary judgment. If an 
unsolicited, informal complaint to management is not a protected activity for 
the purposes of section 510, then an employee who makes this type of 
complaint cannot prevail against her employer in a suit for retaliation. Absent 
other discrimination in violation of another federal law, the employee would 
have no federal cause of action. However, if an unsolicited, informal complaint 
to management is a protected activity for the purposes of section 510, the 
plaintiff may be able to establish a prima facie case of retaliation and may be 
able to survive summary judgment. Thus, the definition of what constitutes a 
protected activity for purposes of section 510 operates as a gatekeeper for 
determining what claims might or might not be able to get past summary 
judgment in federal court. 
II. JUDICIAL CONFUSION IN INTERPRETING SECTION 510 
Despite the importance of appropriately defining what types of activities 
are protected by section 510, the courts that have confronted this issue have 
been anything but consistent. This Part explains and analyzes the reasoning 
underlying the different approaches courts have taken to interpreting the scope 
of section 510. Section A analyzes the decisions of courts concluding section 
510 is broad enough to encompass an employee’s informal, unsolicited 
complaints to management. Section B considers the decisions of courts 
concluding these types of complaints fall outside section 510’s scope. 
A. The Broad Approach: Informal, Unsolicited Complaints to Management 
Are Within the Scope of Section 510 
The Ninth Circuit has taken the broadest approach of all the courts to 
analyze the scope of section 510. In Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii, an 
employee of the Bank of Hawaii complained to two supervisors that they had 
violated several reporting and disclosure requirements as well as certain 
 
 40 See id. at 1043 (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendant because the 
plaintiff did not prove all three elements of the prima facie case). 
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fiduciary standards imposed by ERISA on the administration of the bank’s 
employee benefits plan.41 The bank terminated the employee, and the 
employee filed suit.42 
At issue before the Ninth Circuit on appeal was whether the employee’s 
suit against the bank fell within the scope of ERISA such that it preempted the 
employee’s state law wrongful discharge claim.43 To answer this question, the 
Ninth Circuit had to decide whether an employee’s unsolicited, informal 
complaint to management is within the scope of section 510.44 The Ninth 
Circuit spoke broadly about the purpose of section 510, stating the provision 
“is clearly meant to protect whistle blowers.”45 The court’s reasoning, 
however, is somewhat sparse in that the court did not perform a textual 
analysis of the provision and did not consider the legislative history of ERISA 
in general or section 510 in particular.46 Instead, the court based its analysis on 
the effect a more narrow interpretation of section 510 would have on whistle-
blowers.47 The court explained that although the language of the antiretaliation 
provision mentions “giving information or testifying,”48 “[t]he normal first step 
in giving information or testifying . . . [is] to present the problem first to the 
responsible managers of the ERISA plan.”49 As such, if informal, unsolicited 
complaints to management fall outside the scope of section 510, “the process 
of giving information or testifying is interrupted at its start: the anticipatory 
discharge discourages the whistle blower before the whistle is blown.”50 Based 
 
 41 999 F.2d 408, 409 (9th Cir. 1993). Specifically, the employee alleged that her two supervisors directed 
her to improperly reimburse a former employee from a profit-sharing benefits plan and to recalculate the 
benefit owed to a former employee based on final pay, as opposed to final average pay, which is required by 
ERISA. Id. at 410. 
 42 Id. at 409–10. 
 43 Id. at 410. Section 514(a) of ERISA contains a broad preemption provision that states that the 
provisions of ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit 
plan [subject to regulation under ERISA].” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006); see also WIEDENBECK, supra note 17, 
at 185. For a more complete discussion of the implications of preemption in the context of section 510, see 
infra Part IV.B. 
 44 Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id.; see also Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the 
Ninth Circuit in Hashimoto failed to “examine[] the statutory language of Section 510 in detail”), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011). 
 47 See Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411. The Third Circuit describes the Ninth Circuit’s approach as focusing 
“on the adoption of a ‘fair’ interpretation.” Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223 (citation omitted) (citing Hashimoto, 999 
F.2d at 411). 
 48 Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411 (construing 29 U.S.C. § 1140). 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
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on this reasoning, the court held that informal, unsolicited complaints of 
management about ERISA violations fall within the scope of the provision.51 
The Fifth Circuit has also held that unsolicited, informal complaints to 
management about ERISA violations are within the scope of section 510.52 
The Fifth Circuit’s treatment of the issue, however, was quite superficial and 
almost entirely without reasoning or explanation.53 The court merely stated: 
ERISA § 510 broadly prohibits the termination or other adverse 
treatment of participants and beneficiaries for exercising their ERISA 
rights or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of such 
rights, and prohibits the discharge or other adverse treatment of any 
person because he has given information or testimony relating to 
ERISA.54 
About the only support given for the proposition is a citation with approval55 to 
a Minnesota district court case, McLean v. Carlson Companies.56 
McLean purports to be the first case to consider whether informal, 
unsolicited complaints to management concerning ERISA violations are within 
the scope of section 510.57 In McLean, the defendant employer terminated the 
plaintiff’s employment because the plaintiff told her manager about potential 
ERISA violations “in connection with the administration of the employee 
benefit plan.”58 The plaintiff then sued her employer for violating the state’s 
whistle-blower statute.59 As in Hashimoto, the issue before the court was 
whether ERISA preempted the plaintiff’s state law claim.60 If section 510 were 
broad enough to encompass unsolicited, informal complaints to management, 
 
 51 Id. As a consequence of this holding, the court also held that ERISA preempts state law claims for 
retaliatory discharge when an employee is discharged in retaliation for making an unsolicited, informal 
complaint to management about a violation of ERISA. Id. at 412. 
 52 Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1313–15 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 53 See id.; see also Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[T]he Fifth 
Circuit gave the issue cursory treatment . . . .” (citing Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1314)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1604 (2011). 
 54 Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006)). 
 55 Id. at 1315 n.5. 
 56 777 F. Supp. 1480 (D. Minn. 1991). The interpretation adopted in McLean has been upheld even after 
other circuits have adopted contrary interpretations. See Simons v. Midwest Tel. Sales & Serv., Inc., 462 F. 
Supp. 2d 1004, 1008 (D. Minn. 2006). 
 57 See McLean, 777 F. Supp. at 1483 (“The parties have not cited, and the court is unable to find, a case 
addressing this precise issue.”). 
 58 Id. at 1481. 
 59 Id. at 1481 & n.1. 
 60 Id. at 1482. 
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ERISA would preempt any state law claims. The dispositive issue was the 
same as in Hashimoto: the scope of section 510.61 
The court began by noting that ERISA lacks any specific “provision which 
provides plaintiff the specific right to report violations of federal law to her 
superiors or those responsible for the plan’s administration.”62 Nevertheless, 
the court reasoned, ERISA explicitly gives individuals “the right to sue to 
enjoin any act or practice which violates ERISA.”63 The plaintiff clearly would 
have had a cause of action against her employer had she been terminated after 
filing suit against the employer, alleging violations of ERISA.64 Yet, the court 
explained, to interpret the antiretaliation provision in such a way that the 
plaintiff was only protected after commencing a lawsuit against the employer 
would encourage unnecessary litigation by “provid[ing] a strong incentive to 
plan participants to institute litigation without first attempting to resolve the 
issue informally.”65 Based on this reasoning, the court “f[ound] it logical to 
infer that plaintiff also possesse[d] the right to inform plan administrators of 
suspected violations of ERISA” prior to filing suit.66 The court concluded that 
informal, unsolicited complaints to management are protected activities within 
the scope of section 510.67 
The Ninth Circuit in Hashimoto68 and the Minnesota district court in 
McLean69 (cited with approval by the Fifth Circuit in Anderson70) both 
concluded that informal, unsolicited complaints by management fall within the 
scope of section 510. They reached this conclusion, however, on different 
grounds. The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Hashimoto was grounded in an 
interpretation of section 510 that focused primarily on the rights of whistle-
blowers and on promoting an ideal of fairness.71 By contrast, the Minnesota 
district court’s reasoning was not focused on the rights of employees but 
 
 61 Id. at 1483. 
 62 Id. at 1484. 
 63 Id. (citing Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) 
(2006)). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 69 McLean, 777 F. Supp. at 1484. 
 70 Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 71 See 999 F.2d at 411; see also Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“[T]he Ninth Circuit appeared to focus its analysis on the adoption of a ‘fair’ interpretation.” (citation 
omitted) (citing Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411)), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011). 
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instead on the efficacy of the process for reporting ERISA violations—in 
particular, the public policy against implementing rules that encourage 
litigation.72 
Although grounded in different rationales, neither the Ninth Circuit in 
Hashimoto nor the Minnesota district court in McLean embarked in any detail 
on any kind of textual analysis or analysis of the legislative history of ERISA 
in general or section 510 in particular. The approaches of both courts are 
curious in that courts, when analyzing a statutory provision, typically begin 
their analyses with the text of the statute.73 Yet the Ninth Circuit in Hashimoto 
and the district court in McLean did not attempt to explain section 510’s text at 
all. For example, both courts failed to discuss the fact that section 510 contains 
the words “has given information” and “has testified or is about to testify”74 
and did not attempt to explain whether the phrase “in any inquiry or 
proceeding”75 qualifies or limits an employee’s right to pursue a cause of 
action for retaliation under section 510. Instead, both courts merely glossed 
over the text of the statute. The Ninth Circuit then jumped directly into an 
analysis of protecting the rights of whistle-blowers and promoting fundamental 
fairness,76 and the Minnesota district court grounded its rationale in a desire to 
improve the efficiency of the process for reporting and correcting ERISA 
violations.77 Perhaps this explains why the Third Circuit, in Edwards, criticized 
the reasoning of the decisions interpreting section 510 to create a cause of 
action for employees who face adverse employment actions for making 
informal, unsolicited reports of ERISA violations to management.78 
B. The Narrow Approach: Unsolicited, Informal Complaints to Management 
Fall Outside the Scope of Section 510 
The Ninth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Minnesota district court all took a 
broad approach to defining the scope of section 510. By contrast, the Second 
Circuit,79 Third Circuit,80 and Fourth Circuit81 have interpreted section 510 
 
 72 McLean, 777 F. Supp. at 1484. 
 73 See EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 275 (1994) (“It is commonplace that statutory 
interpretation must begin with the words of the statute.”); see also infra Part III.A. 
 74 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 77 McLean, 777 F. Supp. at 1484. 
 78 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 
(2011). 
 79 See Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
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more narrowly, holding that informal, unsolicited complaints to management 
fall outside its scope. Although all three of these circuits engage in a more 
conventional statutory analysis than the Ninth Circuit did in Hashimoto or the 
district court did in McLean,82 each reasons through the statutory analysis 
differently, and none adequately interprets section 510 in light of congressional 
intent. 
The Second Circuit, in Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc.,83 takes what is 
perhaps the broadest approach of the circuit courts that conclude that 
unsolicited, informal complaints to management about violations of ERISA 
fall outside the scope of section 510. Nicolaou involved an employee who 
discovered that her employer was underfunding the company’s 401(k) plan.84 
Upon discovering the discrepancy, the employee expressed her concern to the 
company’s chief financial officer, who advised her to drop the matter.85 The 
employee then took her complaint to the company’s president, who demoted 
the employee from director of human resources and administration, to office 
manager, and then terminated her a short time later.86 The employee filed suit 
alleging, among other things, that her termination violated section 510.87 
To determine whether the district court had properly granted the 
employer’s 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Second Circuit had to decide 
whether the employee’s termination could constitute a violation of section 
510.88 The answer to this question depended entirely on the provision’s 
scope.89 The Second Circuit began its analysis by examining the plain 
language of section 510.90 The court noted that the statute, on its face, protects 
employees who participate in an “inquiry or proceeding.”91 According to the 
court, the inclusion of both the word “inquiry” and the word “proceeding” in 
the statute suggests that both formal and informal complaints fall within the 
 
 80 See Edwards, 403 F.3d at 217. 
 81 See King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427–28 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 82 For a discussion of varying methods of statutory interpretation, see generally HANKS ET AL., supra note 
73, at 267–90. 
 83 Nicolaou, 402 F.3d 325. 
 84 Id. at 326. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 326–27. 
 87 Id. at 327. 
 88 Id. at 327–28. 
 89 Id. at 328. 
 90 Id. at 328–29. 
 91 Id. at 328 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 
U.S.C. § 1140 (2006)). 
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scope of activities protected by section 510.92 The court found further support 
for this conclusion in the fact that the plain language of section 510 contains 
the phrase “[has] given information” in addition to “has testified or is about to 
testify,” suggesting that Congress intended the provision to protect employees 
who engage in both formal and informal activities.93 
Having concluded that the formality of the setting in which the plaintiff’s 
complaint took place was not determinative of whether the activity the plaintiff 
participated in fell within the scope of section 510, the court then turned to the 
question of what types of activities constitute an “inquiry” or “proceeding.”94 
According to the court, this issue was the touchstone of the analysis of whether 
the activity the plaintiff was engaged in falls within the scope of section 510.95 
The court first noted that “[t]he ‘informal gathering of information’ . . . falls 
within the plain meaning of ‘inquiry,’ and . . . is protected by Section 510.”96 
The court suggested, however, that the fact that the corporation’s outside 
counsel told the plaintiff to meet with the company’s president to discuss the 
plaintiff’s concerns was a crucial factor in determining that the plaintiff’s 
complaint to the president was an “inquiry” that fell within the scope of section 
510.97 The court stated, “Certainly, if [the plaintiff] can demonstrate that she 
was contacted to meet with [the president] in order to give information about 
the alleged underfunding of the Plan, her actions would fall within the 
protection of Section 510.”98 By implication, the court seemed to suggest that, 
had the plaintiff gone to the company’s president on her own accord (i.e., 
without the suggestion of the company’s outside counsel), the plaintiff’s 
informal, unsolicited complaint would have fallen outside the scope of section 
510.99 Nicolaou seems to suggest that, although solicited, informal complaints 
 
 92 Id. at 328–29. 
 93 Id. at 329 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1140). 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. at 328–29. 
 96 Id. at 329 (emphasis added). 
 97 Id. at 329–30. 
 98 Id. at 330 (emphasis added). 
 99 The Third Circuit certainly reads Nicolaou as concluding that unsolicited, informal complaints to 
management fall outside the scope of section 510’s antiretaliation provision. See Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & 
Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011). However, whether it is 
necessary that the plaintiff’s complaint be made in response to a suggestion by a supervisor or someone who 
represents management to be considered a protected activity within the scope of section 510 is somewhat 
unclear following Nicolaou. That is, it is unclear whether the outcome in Nicolaou would have been different 
had the plaintiff made an unsolicited complaint to the company’s president, as opposed to only making a 
complaint after being encouraged to do so by the company’s outside counsel. See, e.g., Ello v. Singh, 531 F. 
Supp. 2d 552, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“While Plaintiff does not allege he was responding to, or providing 
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to management are protected activities, unsolicited, informal complaints to 
management are not protected activities and fall outside the scope of section 
510.100 That is, the Second Circuit’s approach in Nicolaou seems to turn on 
whether the plaintiff or management initiates the complaint. If the plaintiff 
initiates the complaint, the complaint does not fall within the scope of the 
statute’s protection, and the plaintiff cannot make out the first element of her 
prima facie case.101 If management approaches the plaintiff, however, then the 
complaint falls within the scope of the statute’s protection, and the plaintiff can 
establish the first element of her prima facie case.102 
This interpretation of section 510 is problematic because it is virtually 
impossible to apply in practice. First, there is an unanswered question as to 
when an “inquiry” has occurred under the court’s definition of the word. On 
the one hand, the court seems to be suggesting that whether the plaintiff has 
engaged in an “inquiry” depends on whether the plaintiff or management 
initiates the conversation. On the other hand, it could be the case that an 
employee who approaches management faces a barrage of questions by the 
employer concerning the allegations that the employee is attempting to report. 
The court’s opinion in Nicolaou provides no guidance as to how to evaluate 
when the meeting between the plaintiff and management becomes an 
“inquiry.” Is it as soon as the management representative asks the plaintiff a 
single question? If not, when would the informal meeting between the plaintiff 
and management become an “inquiry” under the test applied by the Second 
Circuit in Nicolaou? 
Even more problematic, however, is the perverse incentives the court’s 
interpretation of the word “inquiry” creates for the employer. Regardless of 
which way Nicolaou is applied, the employer has a strong incentive not to ask 
questions or further investigate when an employee makes an informal 
complaint to management that an ERISA violation is occurring. Under 
Nicolaou, it seems clear that, when the plaintiff makes an informal complaint 
to management and the employer does nothing in response, the plaintiff has not 
 
information to, a formal inquiry, Plaintiff’s claims regarding his alleged efforts at scheduling a meeting with 
decision-makers and those who might begin a formal inquiry, could constitute a Section 510 claim.”). 
Accordingly, this Comment has characterized the Second Circuit’s approach as the broadest of the approaches 
that conclude that unsolicited, informal complaints to management are not within the scope of section 510’s 
antiretaliation provision. See supra text accompanying note 83. 
 100 See supra note 99. 
 101 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
 102 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. 
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engaged in a protected activity and can be terminated in retaliation without 
imposing liability on the employer under section 510. However, if the 
employer initiates the “inquiry,” or if the employer begins an investigation into 
the plaintiff’s allegations, the interaction between the employee and 
management may very well qualify as an “inquiry” under the Second Circuit’s 
definition of the word. The consequence of the employer creating an “inquiry” 
is that the employee’s complaint falls within the scope of section 510. That is, 
the employer is subject to liability if the employer takes any adverse 
employment action against the employee. The employer could avoid liability 
by simply failing to do anything in response to the employee’s unsolicited 
complaint. Under the rule in Nicolaou, then, the employer’s best course of 
action may very well be to ignore an employee’s unsolicited complaints about 
ERISA violations and do absolutely nothing in response to them. 
In spite of the problems with this rule, the Third Circuit seems to have 
adopted, at least in part, the rule from Nicolaou in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & 
Son, Inc.103 In Edwards, the human resources director of a family-owned 
company discovered that corporate management was committing several 
ERISA violations with respect to the company’s group health insurance 
plan.104 Specifically, the human resources director discovered that management 
was administering the plan in a discriminatory manner, attempting to 
discourage employees from participating in the plan by misrepresenting the 
cost of coverage under the plan, and providing made-up social security 
numbers and other false information to insurance companies to enroll 
noncitizens in the plan.105 The human resources director voiced her objection 
to management concerning these practices and was terminated in retaliation.106 
She filed suit, alleging that her termination violated section 510.107 
The district court, relying on Nicolaou, granted the employer’s 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss.108 The Third Circuit affirmed.109 After noting the circuit 
split on whether unsolicited, informal complaints to management fall within 
 
 103 610 F.3d at 225–26. At least one district court in a circuit that has not yet decided the scope of section 
510’s antiretaliation provision has followed Edwards. See George v. Junior Achievement of Cent. Ind., No. 
1:10-cv-0220-JMS-MJD, 2011 WL 4537006, at *6–7 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2011). 
 104 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 218–19. 
 105 Id. at 219. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., No. 09-cv-1184, 2009 WL 2215074, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 
2009), aff’d, 610 F.3d 217, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 (2011). 
 109 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 220. 
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the scope of section 510, the Third Circuit embarked on a fairly conventional 
statutory analysis by beginning with the plain text of the statute.110 The 
threshold question, then, was whether the text of the antiretaliation provision is 
ambiguous.111 The court concluded that the provision is unambiguous.112 That 
is, by its text, the provision only applies when an employee testifies or gives 
information as part of an “inquiry or proceeding.”113 
The court in Edwards then adopted the same definition of “inquiry” that the 
Second Circuit adopted in Nicolaou.114 The determinative question of whether 
the employee’s informal complaint to management constitutes an “inquiry” is 
whether the complaint is solicited or unsolicited.115 Because the human 
resources director in Edwards approached management, as opposed to 
management approaching her, the human resources director’s complaint to 
management did not fall within the scope of section 510, and she could not 
establish the first element of her prima facie case of retaliation.116 The court 
also noted that the human resources director did not make her complaint in the 
context of a “proceeding,” because the term “proceeding” implies a certain 
level of formality that is not present when an employee makes an informal, 
internal complaint to management.117 Therefore, her complaint failed to state a 
cause of action for which relief could be granted, and dismissal under 12(b)(6) 
was appropriate.118 
The Third Circuit’s approach in Edwards is problematic for largely the 
same reasons as the Second Circuit’s approach in Nicolaou. That is, the 
definition of “inquiry” in Edwards, like the definition of “inquiry” in Nicolaou, 
 
 110 Id. at 222; see also infra Part III.A. 
 111 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 222. 
 112 See id. at 222–24. The court does not explain how the statute’s language is unambiguous in light of the 
fact that various circuit courts of appeals interpreted the statute in vastly different ways. The court seems to 
suggest, however, that the other circuits inappropriately focused on policy and ignored the plain text of the 
statute. See id. 
 113 Id. at 222 (quoting Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 
(2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114 Id. at 223. Notably, the court does not consider other possible definitions of the term “inquiry” and 
does not explain whether the fact that the word “inquiry” is not defined by the statute makes the statute 
ambiguous and therefore susceptible to a deeper analysis. The court brushes aside these concerns and merely 
states, “[W]e find the provision’s plain meaning to be clear.” Id. at 224. 
 115 See id. at 223. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 225–26. 
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creates perverse incentives for the employer. The dissent in Edwards 
recognizes this concern, posing the following hypothetical: 
[S]uppose an employee like [the human resources director] complains 
to her superior, the superior asks some follow-up questions, and the 
employee responds to these questions. Are the informal responses to 
some impromptu questions to be regarded as protected because they 
evidently were made as part of an “inquiry?” In turn, why should 
such responses be protected while, at the same time, an employer is 
essentially permitted (and perhaps, in essence, encouraged) to fire an 
employee immediately after she makes an informal complaint instead 
of conducting an investigation of some sort?119 
The majority in Edwards even acknowledges that the human resources 
director’s complaints “may have eventually ‘culminat[ed]’ in an inquiry”120 but 
concludes only that this further “underscores the fact that the complaints 
themselves, without more, do not constitute an inquiry.”121 Thus, the majority 
seems to concede that even an unsolicited, informal complaint to management 
could eventually become an “inquiry.” However, such a complaint would only 
become an “inquiry” and would thus only constitute a statutorily protected 
activity under section 510, based on the employer’s conduct after the employee 
makes her complaint. That is, “‘inquiry’ includes only inquiries made of an 
employee, not inquiries made by an employee.”122 Under this reasoning, an 
employer faced with an unsolicited, informal complaint by an employee 
concerning an ERISA violation would minimize its potential liability by 
immediately terminating the employee and not investigating the allegations 
further. Yet this result is contrary to what Congress intended when it passed 
ERISA.123 
Perhaps this asymmetry explains why the Fourth Circuit concluded that the 
touchstone for what constitutes a protected activity under section 510 is not 
whether the employee or management was the driving force behind the 
complaint but rather the formality of the setting in which the complaint 
occurred.124 King v. Marriott International, Inc. involved an employee who 
helped manage her employer’s benefit-plan finances as the vice president of 
 
 119 Id. at 228 (Cowen, J., dissenting). 
 120 Id. at 223 (majority opinion) (alteration in original). 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. (emphases added). 
 123 See infra Part III.C. 
 124 See King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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benefits resources.125 During the course of her employment, this employee 
discovered that the senior vice president of compensation and benefits had 
proposed transferring millions of dollars from the company’s health benefit 
plan into its general corporate reserve account.126 Fearing that the senior vice 
president’s plan might violate ERISA, the employee told the senior vice 
president and the company’s in house counsel on multiple occasions that the 
proposed transfer should be scrapped.127 Instead of listening to the employee’s 
concerns, however, the senior vice president decided to terminate her.128 The 
stated reason for the employee’s termination was that their “continuing feud” 
about whether money should be transferred from the company’s health benefit 
plan to the general reserve account “hindered the operation of the benefits 
department.”129 
The employee filed suit in state court against her former employer, alleging 
that her termination was unlawful under state law.130 Her former employer 
removed the case to federal court, arguing that ERISA preempted the 
plaintiff’s state law claims.131 The plaintiff filed a motion to remand or, in the 
alternative, to amend her complaint to allege unlawful retaliation under section 
502 and section 510 of ERISA.132 The district court denied the plaintiff’s 
motion to remand but granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint.133 
The district court then granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment 
on all claims, and the plaintiff appealed.134 
 
 125 Id. at 423. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 423, 425–27. Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA states, “A civil action may be brought . . . by a 
participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this 
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such 
violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) 
(2006). The antiretaliation provision of section 510 is the specific provision “of this subchapter” the plaintiff 
sought to enforce in her amended complaint. See King, 337 F.3d at 425. In essence, the plaintiff’s amended 
complaint alleged that she had a cause of action under section 502 by virtue of the antiretaliation provision of 
section 510. See id. This technicality is not important to the court’s analysis of the issues this Comment is 
concerned with. As such, this Comment treats the plaintiff’s amended complaint as if she had merely alleged 
unlawful retaliation in violation of section 510. This is consistent with the way the Fourth Circuit treats the 
plaintiff’s amended complaint in its decision. See id. at 427–28. 
 133 King, 337 F.3d at 423–24. 
 134 Id. at 424. 
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On appeal, the central issue before the Fourth Circuit was whether the 
plaintiff’s state law claims were preempted by ERISA.135 To determine the 
answer, the court first had to determine whether the plaintiff alleged a violation 
of section 510.136 If the plaintiff’s complaint to the senior vice president was a 
protected activity within the scope of section 510, then the plaintiff could 
establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation, and the employer’s 
termination of the plaintiff may have violated section 510. However, if the 
plaintiff’s complaint to the senior vice president was not a protected activity 
within the scope of section 510, then the employer’s termination of the plaintiff 
for making a complaint about potential ERISA violations would not have 
violated federal law. As a result, the determinative question in King was 
whether an informal, unsolicited complaint to management concerning 
potential ERISA violations falls within the scope of the protection afforded to 
employees by section 510.137 
To begin its analysis, the Fourth Circuit cited the relevant text of section 
510.138 Curiously, however, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis paid little attention to 
one part of section 510’s text.139 That is, although section 510 on its face 
applies to “any person” who has either “given information or has testified or is 
about to testify,”140 the court essentially focused its analysis only on the 
statutory language that makes reference to testimony in an “inquiry or 
proceeding,” treating the language “has given information” as merely ensuring 
that employees who provide information in other than a testimonial form (e.g., 
providing documents) during a formal “inquiry” or “proceeding” are protected 
from retaliation, in essence relegating the language “has given information” 
almost to the level of mere surplusage.141 
According to the Fourth Circuit, then, only employees who give testimony 
within the limited context of a formal “inquiry” or “proceeding” are protected 
 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 426–27. 
 137 Id. at 427. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See id. 
 140 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 141 See King, 337 F.3d at 427 (“In the instant case, . . . the use of the phrase ‘testified or is about to testify’ 
does suggest that the phrase ‘inquir[ies] or proceeding[s]’ referenced in section 510 is limited to the legal or 
administrative, or at least to something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a supervisor. The 
phrase ‘given information’ does no more than insure that even the provision of non-testimonial information 
(such as incriminating documents) in an inquiry or proceeding would be covered.” (alterations in original) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1140)). 
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from retaliation under section 510. The court then reasoned that an “intra-
company complaint” is not an “inquiry or proceeding” because it does not have 
the requisite level of “formal[ity]” to be fairly considered as an “inquiry or 
proceeding.”142 Borrowing from Fourth Circuit precedent interpreting the 
antiretaliation provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act143 (FLSA), the court 
suggested that the scope of section 510 is limited to “administrative or legal 
proceedings,” specifically “procedures conducted in judicial or administrative 
tribunals.”144 This is an exceedingly narrow standard; under this reading of the 
statute, even a formal, internal “proceeding” within the corporation would not 
qualify as an “inquiry” or “proceeding” for purposes of section 510. 
There are several problems with the Fourth Circuit’s analysis. First, 
although the court proclaims that its interpretation is “the most compelling 
interpretation of the statutory language,”145 the interpretation of the scope of 
the provision is far narrower than the statutory language requires on its face. 
The statute itself does not define the terms “inquiry” or “proceeding” and 
contains no language suggesting that an “inquiry” or “proceeding” is limited to 
a formal judicial or administrative setting.146 In fact, the Fourth Circuit’s 
definition of “proceeding” is borrowed from the FLSA, an entirely different 
statute.147 Yet the court makes no attempt to justify its bare assertion that the 
level of formality it would require for a complaint to be a protected activity for 
retaliation purposes in the context of the FLSA is the same as in the context of 
section 510.148 In fact, it is not clear that the scope of these two provisions is 
identical, especially given the fact that the statutory language of the 
antiretaliation provision of the FLSA149 differs in many important respects 
from the statutory language of section 510. For one, the antiretaliation 
provision of the FLSA does not contain the language “has given information” 
or the phrase “any inquiry,” two terms that suggest the scope of section 510 
may be broader than the scope of the antiretaliation provision of the FLSA, in 
spite of the fact that both statutes use the word “proceeding” and make 
reference to “testifying.”150 Second, as this Comment explains in more detail in 
 
 142 Id. 
 143 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 
 144 King, 337 F.3d at 427 (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 
F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000)). 
 145 Id. at 428. 
 146 See 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 147 See King, 337 F.3d at 427. 
 148 See id. 
 149 See infra text accompanying notes 183–86. 
 150 See supra note 15. 
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Part III.A, the Fourth Circuit’s limiting interpretation of the phrase “has given 
information” is not the only possible interpretation of the text of section 510 
taken as a whole, nor is it necessarily the most intuitive interpretation of that 
text. For these reasons, even on a textual level, the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation of section 510 does not seem to pass muster. 
On a purposive level, the flaws of the Fourth Circuit’s analysis are even 
more apparent. For one, the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation completely ignores 
Congress’s intent in enacting ERISA and fails to consider the role of section 
510 in the legislative scheme Congress enacted when it passed ERISA.151 Even 
more fundamentally, however, the Fourth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of 
section 510 hinders the enforcement of the substantive provisions of ERISA 
and leads to excessive litigation by creating perverse incentives for employees 
who discover ERISA violations. Under the Fourth Circuit’s approach, an 
informed employee152 who discovers a potential ERISA violation would have a 
disincentive to informally report the violation to management because she 
could be fired in retaliation with no recourse under federal law. Her incentive 
would be instead to make the complaint within the context of an “inquiry” or 
“proceeding,” which the Fourth Circuit has interpreted only to include 
“administrative or legal proceedings.”153 This incentive creates an unnecessary 
burden on administrative and judicial bodies and may in fact undermine the 
purpose of ERISA because of the expense associated with initiating an 
“administrative or legal proceeding.”154 
This Part has demonstrated that current judicial interpretations of the scope 
of section 510 have failed to interpret section 510 in a way that is faithful to 
both the plain text of the statute and Congress’s intent in passing ERISA. The 
decisions concluding that informal, unsolicited complaints to management are 
statutorily protected activities under section 510 have concentrated either on 
the substantive purpose of ERISA or on procedural efficiency, at the expense 
of the provision’s text.155 From a statutory-interpretation perspective, the 
 
 151 See infra note 189 and accompanying text. 
 152 It is not unreasonable to assume that such an employee would be well-informed enough to recognize 
this disincentive because many employees who are in a position to discover potential ERISA violations by 
their employers are likely human resources professionals who work with employee benefits on a day-to-day 
basis and have a working knowledge of ERISA. Alternatively, an employee who discovers a potential ERISA 
violation may choose to consult with her attorney, who would presumably advise her not to make an informal 
complaint to management because such a complaint would afford her no protection from retaliation. 
 153 King, 337 F.3d at 427. 
 154 See infra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 155 See supra Part II.A. 
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analyses of these courts are not very satisfying and have not been widely 
adopted among the circuit courts of appeals. At the same time, the courts that 
have held that informal, unsolicited complaints to management fall outside the 
scope of section 510 have focused too much on the plain text of the statute at 
the expense of congressional intent. These courts have either been too quick to 
consider the text of the statute unambiguous or have ignored ERISA’s remedial 
purpose and congressional intent, not to mention the role of section 510 in the 
legislative scheme created by Congress by enacting ERISA. This has created 
perverse incentives both for employers and employees that frustrate the 
achievement of Congress’s objectives in passing ERISA. 
III.  A PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 510 
This Part attempts to bridge the gap between the two types of approaches 
explained in Part II. It argues in favor of a pragmatic interpretation of section 
510 grounded in the statutory language yet faithful to congressional intent and 
purpose. Section A begins with the plain text of the statute and proposes a 
reading of section 510 that allows informal, unsolicited complaints to 
management to fall within its scope. Section B considers the importance the 
Supreme Court has attached to congressional purpose and intent in interpreting 
other antiretaliation statutes. It argues that the Supreme Court could use a 
similar approach to interpret section 510 broadly. Section C demonstrates that 
a broad interpretation of section 510’s scope is faithful to Congress’s intent in 
passing ERISA and furthers ERISA’s remedial purpose. 
A. Textual Analysis of Section 510 
In a traditional statutory analysis, courts “look first to the statutory 
language” and only consider extrinsic factors if the statutory language is 
unclear.156 This section does just that. It analyzes the plain text of section 510 
to demonstrate two points: (1) it is plausible to read section 510 as 
encompassing unsolicited, informal complaints to management about potential 
ERISA violations; and (2) the plain text of section 510 is susceptible to 
multiple interpretations, which allows courts to properly consider extrinsic 
factors to determine the provision’s scope.157 
 
 156 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). 
 157 Cf. id. at 896–97 (examining the legislative history of a statute to determine its appropriate meaning 
because the statutory text was unclear). See generally HANKS ET AL., supra note 73, at 300–32 (providing 
numerous examples of courts that have considered extrinsic sources to determine a statute’s meaning when the 
plain text of the statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations). 
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Section 510 states in relevant part, “It shall be unlawful for any person to 
discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he 
has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or 
proceeding relating to this chapter.”158 Broadly, section 510 can be divided into 
three distinct parts. The first part defines the activities an employer is 
prohibited from taking against an employee who falls within the scope of the 
provision. The plain text of the second part of the provision protects only 
employees who engage in three types of activities: (1) giving information, (2) 
testifying, and (3) preparing to testify. Clearly, the latter two of these activities 
are not relevant to whether an employee who makes an informal, unsolicited 
complaint to management falls within the scope of the statute’s protection. It 
seems equally as clear, however, that an employee who makes an informal, 
unsolicited complaint to management has given information concerning a 
violation of ERISA. Thus, no language in the second part of section 510 
prevents unsolicited, informal complaints to management from falling within 
the provision’s scope. 
As to the third part of section 510, “in any inquiry or proceeding relating to 
this chapter,” there are two possible interpretations. Based on the text alone, it 
seems clear that the third part of the provision qualifies at least some of the 
provision’s second part. However, the extent to which the third part qualifies 
the second part is ambiguous. One plausible reading of the statutory text is that 
the third part qualifies the context in which all three types of activities 
protected by the second part must occur to be protected. That is, an employee 
is only protected if she gives information, testifies, or prepares to testify in one 
of two specific contexts: (1) “any inquiry” or (2) a “proceeding.” Under this 
interpretation, if the employee gives information outside the context of “any 
inquiry” or a “proceeding,” the employee’s activity is outside the scope of 
section 510 and is not protected.159 
A second interpretation of this part of the provision’s text is also plausible, 
however. It is conceivable from a plain reading of the provision’s text that 
“any inquiry” and “proceeding” only qualify the context in which the actions 
of testifying or preparing to testify must occur, but do not qualify the context in 
 
 158 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
 159 Other antidiscrimination-in-employment statutes have antiretaliation provisions that on their face 
define their scope much more broadly. For example, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision protects any 
employee who “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or 
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, 
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
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which the action of giving information must occur to be protected. Under this 
interpretation, section 510 operates as follows: an employee participates in a 
protected activity if she (1) gives information concerning a potential ERISA 
violation or (2) testifies or prepares to testify in “any inquiry” or “proceeding” 
concerning a potential ERISA violation. This interpretation of the provision is 
faithful to the provision’s text. That is, section 510 makes sense grammatically 
even if the phrase “or has testified or is about it testify in any inquiry or 
proceeding” is eliminated. Without this phrase, the provision reads, “It shall be 
unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate 
against any person because he has given information . . . relating to this 
chapter.”160 Accordingly, it is plausible to read the statute’s plain text to 
conclude that employees who give information about ERISA violations are 
protected, even if the action of giving information does not occur within the 
context of “any inquiry” or “proceeding.” 
Assuming, however, for purposes of argument, that Congress intended to 
limit the scope of section 510 by protecting only employees who give 
information within the context of “any inquiry” or “proceeding,” such an 
interpretation does not foreclose the possibility that informal, unsolicited 
complaints to management concerning ERISA violations fall within the 
provision’s scope and are protected activities. The language “any inquiry or 
proceeding,” when interpreted in light of the provision’s purposes, is broad 
enough to encompass informal, unsolicited complaints to management. 
To begin with, it is clear that informal, unsolicited complaints to 
management are not “proceedings” and do not fall within the scope of section 
510 on that basis, because the word “proceeding” suggests a level of formality 
that is not present in the context of an informal complaint to management.161 
Yet the text does not limit the scope of section 510’s antiretaliation provision 
only to “proceedings,” in spite of the fact that the Fourth Circuit in King seems 
to consider an “inquiry” and a “proceeding” as one and the same.162 Thus, as 
every circuit court of appeals other than the Fourth Circuit seems to recognize, 
complaints that occur in less formal settings could fall within the “inquiry” 
mentioned in section 510. 
 
 160 29 U.S.C. § 1140. 
 161 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1604 
(2011). 
 162 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
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By the statute’s plain text, complaints about ERISA violations may be 
protected if they occur within the context of “any inquiry.”163 Whether 
unsolicited, informal complaints to management fall within the provision’s 
scope under this interpretation of the statute, therefore, depends on whether 
such complaints fall within the definition of “any inquiry.” The statute does not 
define the term “inquiry.” When a statute does not define a key word, courts 
will interpret the statute in light of the word’s “ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning.”164 Webster’s Dictionary gives two possible definitions of 
the word “inquiry”: (1) “the act or an instance of seeking truth, information, or 
knowledge about something[;] examination into facts or principles,” and (2) 
“the act or an instance of asking for information[;] a request for 
information.”165 The synonym guide beneath these definitions indicates the 
term’s common usage: “[Inquiry] is a general term applicable to any quest for 
truth, knowledge, or information.”166 
The statute’s use of the word “any” to describe which types of inquiries the 
provision protects is also significant. “Any” is commonly defined as “one or 
some indiscriminately of whatever kind.”167 The use of the term “any” 
indicates that Congress intended the scope of the provision to be inclusive, 
rather than exclusive. That is, Congress intended protected activities to be 
defined broadly, as opposed to narrowly.168 Had Congress intended to define 
the scope of protected activities more narrowly, Congress could have used the 
term “an inquiry,” as opposed to the broader statutory language Congress 
chose to use, “any inquiry.”169 
An informal, unsolicited complaint to management could conceivably fall 
within the common usage of the term “any inquiry.” As Webster’s explains, 
“inquiry” is commonly used as a general term that refers to a whole host of 
information-seeking activities. Nothing in the common usage of the word 
“inquiry” requires that the activity have a certain level of formality to be 
considered an “inquiry.” Similarly, nothing in the common usage of the word 
 
 163 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (emphasis added). 
 164 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). 
 165 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, UNABRIDGED 1167 (1986). 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 97. 
 168 Cf. Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1332 (2011) (reasoning that 
the use of the word “any” to qualify the noun “complaint” in the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision supports a 
broad construction of what types of activities are protected activities for the purpose of the antiretaliation 
statute). 
 169 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (emphasis added). 
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“inquiry” suggests that an “inquiry” is defined by who initiates it. Accordingly, 
the fact that the sharing of information is unsolicited does not suggest that it 
cannot be considered an “inquiry.” Perhaps the closest case of whether an 
informal, unsolicited complaint to management could fall within the common 
meaning of “any inquiry” is when an employee merely reports to management 
a potential ERISA violation, perhaps by e-mail, without expecting a response. 
Yet in light of the broad common meaning of “inquiry,” the statute’s use of the 
word “any,” and Congress’s intent in passing ERISA and including section 
510, such a scenario could potentially be construed as “any inquiry” and would 
therefore be considered a protected activity. That is, it would make sense for an 
employee who reported a potential ERISA violation to management to say, “I 
inquired with my manager about a potential violation of federal law.” 
B. Statutory Interpretation in the Retaliation Context 
Even if section 510 were not susceptible to multiple interpretations, 
Congress’s intent and the statute’s legislative history would not be irrelevant. 
This is particularly true in the context of antiretaliation provisions of other 
antidiscrimination-in-employment statutes. This section draws on decisions 
from the Supreme Court and other appellate courts from various areas of 
retaliation law to demonstrate a judicial willingness to broadly construe 
antiretaliation statutes to further congressional purpose and intent. 
In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government, the Supreme Court, interpreting 
the opposition clause of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, discussed not only 
the plain meaning of the word “oppose” but also the policy reasons justifying a 
broad construction of the provision’s scope.170 In CBOCS West, Inc. v. 
Humphries, the Supreme Court went even further, holding that § 1981, which 
broadly prohibits racial discrimination in contractual relationships, including 
employment,171 creates a cause of action for employees who are fired in 
retaliation for complaining to management about racial discrimination, in spite 
of the fact that § 1981’s text does not contain an antiretaliation provision at 
all.172 In so holding, the Court relied heavily on the 1969 case, Sullivan v. Little 
 
 170 129 S. Ct. 846, 851–53 (2009). The Supreme Court subsequently held in a unanimous decision that 
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision is broad enough to protect individuals who are closely related to an 
employee who files an EEOC charge, as long as both individuals work for the same company, even though the 
text of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision does not explicitly create a cause of action for these third-party 
retaliation claims. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868, 870 (2011). 
 171 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 
 172 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954–55 (2008). 
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Hunting Park, Inc.,173 which relied largely on legislative history to conclude 
that § 1981’s “sister statute,”174 § 1982,175 creates a cause of action for 
retaliation.176 In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, the Supreme 
Court, relying on Sullivan, held that Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
which prohibits discrimination in education on the basis of sex, encompasses 
retaliation claims, even though the statute’s text does not explicitly prohibit 
retaliation.177 In so holding, the Court relied heavily on Congress’s intent in 
passing Title IX, stating, “Congress enacted Title IX not only to prevent the 
use of federal dollars to support discriminatory practices, but also ‘to provide 
individual citizens effective protection against those practices.’”178 The Court 
went on to explain, “Reporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title 
IX enforcement and would be discouraged if retaliation against those who 
report went unpunished. Indeed, if retaliation were not prohibited, Title IX’s 
enforcement scheme would unravel.”179 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also applied a broad construction of 
antiretaliation provisions outside the context of race and sex discrimination. 
For example, in NLRB v. Scrivener, the Court held that the antiretaliation 
provision of the National Labor Relations Act protects employees who give 
written sworn statements to investigators,180 even though the provision’s text 
on its face protects only employees who are “discharge[d] or otherwise 
discriminate[d] against . . . because [they have] filed charges or given 
testimony.”181 In reaching its conclusion, the Court stated, “The [provision’s] 
reference . . . to an employee who ‘has filed charges or given testimony,’ could 
be read strictly and confined in its reach to formal charges and formal 
testimony. It can also be read more broadly.”182 To determine whether to 
broadly or narrowly construe the statute, the Court relied on congressional 
intent and the statute’s purpose: “Construing [the provision] to protect the 
 
 173 396 U.S. 229 (1969). 
 174 CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1956. 
 175 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Section 1982 prohibits racial discrimination in connection with the ownership, 
purchase, or sale of real property. Id. 
 176 Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237; see also Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 176 (2005) 
(“[I]n Sullivan we interpreted a general prohibition on racial discrimination to cover retaliation against those 
who advocate the rights of groups protected by that prohibition.”).  
 177 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 178. 
 178 Id. at 180 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)). 
 179 Id. 
 180 405 U.S. 117, 121 (1972). 
 181 National Labor Relations Act § 8(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006). 
 182 Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 122 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4)). 
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employee during the investigative stages, as well as in connection with the 
filing of a formal charge or the giving of formal testimony, comports with [its] 
objective.”183 
In a more recent case, the Supreme Court took a similar approach. In 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., the Court held that the 
antiretaliation provision of the FLSA was broad enough to protect employees 
who make oral as well as written complaints, even though the provision’s text 
does not expressly protect employees who make oral complaints.184 In so 
holding, the Court demonstrated a willingness to look beyond the plain text of 
the provision. The Court reasoned that “dictionary meanings, even if 
considered alone, do not necessarily limit the scope of the statutory 
[language].”185 The task of the judiciary in interpreting an antiretaliation statute 
is to “look[] for the ‘limits’ of a linguistic phrase rather than what 
‘exemplif[ies]’ its application.”186 In other words, the “enforcement needs” of 
antiretaliation statutes “argue for an interpretation [of the statutory text] 
that . . . provide[s] ‘broad rather than narrow protection to the employee.’”187 
These types of cases illustrate that an “inquiry” into congressional intent 
and purpose are very informative for courts that are interpreting what types of 
retaliation claims are cognizable under various federal antidiscrimination-in-
employment statutes. Supreme Court precedent does not blindly adhere to a 
narrow reading of the text of such statutes, particularly when that text is 
susceptible to multiple interpretations. In line with these precedents, the term 
“inquiry” in section 510 should be interpreted with an eye toward the purposes 
of ERISA and Congress’s intent. In particular, section 510 should be 
understood in terms of its relation to the entire administrative regulatory 
scheme that Congress intended in implementing ERISA. 
 
 183 Id. at 121. 
 184 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335 (2011) (construing Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 215(a)(3)). The antiretaliation provision of the FLSA states: 
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person . . . to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against 
any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be 
instituted any proceeding under or related to this chapter, or has testified or is about to testify in 
any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on an industry committee. 
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). 
 185 Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1331. 
 186 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 129 S. Ct. 846, 851 (2009)). 
 187 Id. at 1334 (quoting Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 122). 
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C. Staying True to Congressional Intent 
Section B illustrated how congressional intent can inform judicial 
interpretations of antiretaliation statutes. This section specifically considers 
Congress’s intent in passing ERISA. It argues that the legislative history 
supports a broad construction of section 510. 
Undeniably, one of the results of Congress’s implementation of ERISA is 
the creation of a complex and comprehensive federal regulatory scheme with 
regard to pensions and other employee benefit plans.188 Underlying this 
complex system is Congress’s intent “to assure American workers that they 
may look forward with anticipation to a retirement with financial security and 
dignity, and without fear that this period of life will be lacking in the 
necessities to sustain them as human beings within our society.”189 
Congress passed ERISA primarily due to perceived shortcomings in the 
then-existing federal laws regulating pensions and other types of employee 
benefit plans, in particular the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 
1958.190 Specifically, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958 
mandated only limited disclosure of information concerning pension and other 
employee benefit plans and lacked fiduciary standards for plan 
administrators.191 In addition, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 
1958 was inadequate in that it relied solely “upon the initiative of the 
individual employee to police the management of his plan.”192 As the Senate 
Report concerning the passage of ERISA noted, under the then-existing 
system, “[i]n almost every instance, participants los[t] their benefits not 
because of some violation of federal law, but rather because of the manner in 
which the plan [wa]s executed with respect to its contractual requirements of 
vesting or funding.”193 In fact, under the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure 
Act of 1958, it was common for plan administrators to manage large sums of 
money with little or no oversight, which “created a temptation for self-dealing 
and improper handling of . . . funds” intended to provide for retirement income 
 
 188 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 189 S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4849. 
 190 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 1 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639; S. REP. NO. 93-
127, at 3. 
 191 H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, at 4. 
 192 Id. 
 193 S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 5. 
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for employees.194 Before ERISA, mismanagement of employee benefit plans 
was rampant and workers were often denied the retirement benefits they had 
rightfully accrued over a lifetime of hard work.195 
In addition to tightening federal regulation of pension and other employee 
benefit plans to prevent abuses and mismanagement by plan administrators, 
Congress also intended that ERISA would open the door to the courts for 
individual employees to enforce their rights under federal law.196 As a result, 
ERISA contained several important enforcement provisions that were 
“designed specifically to provide . . . participants and beneficiaries with broad 
remedies for redressing or preventing violations of [ERISA].”197 These 
provisions include section 502(a), which creates a civil action for individuals 
to enforce the substantive provisions of ERISA,198 and section 510, which 
“proscribes interference with rights protected by ERISA.”199 The Senate 
Report explains in broad terms the importance of these enforcement provisions 
with respect to the overall legislative scheme Congress intended by 
implementing ERISA: 
The intent of the Committee is to provide the full range of legal and 
equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and to 
remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past 
appear to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary 
responsibilities . . . or recovery of benefits due to participants.200 
The Supreme Court has subsequently interpreted ERISA’s enforcement 
provisions broadly and as an indispensable part of ERISA’s legislative scheme, 
describing them simultaneously as “a comprehensive civil enforcement 
scheme”201 and as “one of the essential tools for accomplishing the stated 
purposes of ERISA.”202 
The legislative history specific to section 510 is also indicative of the 
importance that Congress intended to attach to that particular provision. During 
 
 194 Carlton R. Sickles, Introduction: The Significance and Complexity of ERISA, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
205, 206 (1975). 
 195 S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 5. 
 196 Id. at 35. 
 197 Id. 
 198 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006). 
 199 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990) (discussing 29 U.S.C. § 1140). 
 200 S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35. 
 201 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987). 
 202 Id. at 52. 
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floor debates on ERISA, Senator Javits, one of the bill’s primary sponsors, 
indicated that section 510 was an “extraordinary reform” that was intended to 
“provide a remedy for any person fired [for exercising her rights under ERISA] 
such as is provided for a person discriminated against because of race or sex, 
for example.”203 When pressed about the effect of section 510, Senator Javits 
reiterated, “This gives the employee the same right” as an employee 
unlawfully terminated on the basis of race or sex in violation of Title VII.204 As 
this Comment has noted, the Supreme Court has taken a broad approach to 
interpreting antiretaliation provisions in statutes that protect against race and 
sex discrimination.205 Senator Javits’s statement indicates that Congress 
intended a similarly broad protection against retaliation in the context of 
ERISA. 
The Senate Report also supports the fact that Congress considered section 
510 as extremely important to the legislative scheme Congress enacted by 
passing ERISA.206 It describes why section 510207 and section 511208 were 
included as follows: 
These provisions were added by the Committee in the face of 
evidence that in some plans a worker’s pension rights or the 
expectations of those rights were interfered with by the use of 
economic sanctions or violent reprisals. Although the instances of 
these occurrences are relatively small in number, the Committee has 
concluded that safeguards are required to preclude this type of abuse 
from being carried out and in order to completely secure the rights 
 
 203 119 CONG. REC. 30,044 (1973) (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits). 
 204 Id. (statement of Sen. Jacob Javits). 
 205 See supra Part III.B. 
 206 See S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35–36 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4871–72. 
 207 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
 208 Id. § 1141. Section 511 is similar in effect to section 510 in that both provisions create a deterrent to 
the interference with rights protected by ERISA. Whereas section 510 deters individuals from interfering with 
protected rights by imposing civil penalties, see id. § 1140, section 511 deters individuals from interfering with 
protected rights by imposing criminal penalties, see id. § 1141. Section 511 states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person through the use of fraud, force, violence, or threat of the use 
of force or violence, to restrain, coerce, intimidate, or attempt to restrain, coerce, or intimidate 
any participant or beneficiary for the purpose of interfering with or preventing the exercise of any 
right to which he is or may become entitled under the plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of this 
title, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act. Any person who willfully violates this 
section shall be fined $100,000 or imprisoned for not more than 10 years, or both. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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and expectations brought into being by this landmark reform 
legislation.209 
This language indicates that Congress intended these enforcement provisions 
to be interpreted in a way that most completely “secure[s] the rights and 
expectations brought into being by [ERISA].”210 The Supreme Court has also 
noted the importance Congress attached to section 510 when it implemented 
ERISA, stating, “Congress viewed . . . section [510] as a crucial part of ERISA 
because, without it, employers would be able to circumvent the provision of 
promised benefits.”211 
Narrow interpretations of the scope of ERISA’s enforcement provisions, 
including section 510, are inadequate to accomplish this objective.212 Unlike 
Title VII, which has the purpose of eliminating long-standing barriers to 
employees’ advancement because of deeply ingrained societal discrimination 
on the basis of race and gender, one of ERISA’s purposes is to prohibit 
employers from taking certain actions that their monetary self-interest would 
dictate that they take.213 That is, although a manager might discriminate against 
an employee on the basis of her race or gender because of the manager’s bias, 
a manager typically violates section 510 because there is a strong economic 
incentive to do so.214 Accordingly, while society over time has begun to 
change its attitudes toward women and racial minorities in the workplace, 
managers continue to face increased pressure to maximize profits and decrease 
costs.215 And although societal norms have changed in a way as to greatly 
disfavor discrimination because of race or gender, and in turn create a 
disincentive to discriminate on the basis of race or gender, the economic 
incentive to interfere with employees who attempt to exercise their rights under 
ERISA remains strong. In light of this strong economic incentive, a narrow 
construction of ERISA’s enforcement provisions will fail to protect the rights 
of employees created by ERISA because managers will not fear getting caught. 
As a result, a broad judicial construction of ERISA’s enforcement provisions 
 
 209 S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 36. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990). 
 212 See Dana M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or Congressional Compromise?, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1, 53 
(1995) (suggesting that ERISA’s enforcement provisions have been interpreted narrowly, which has resulted in 
a “fail[ure] to provide adequate deterrence against wrongdoing”). 
 213 Id. at 50–51. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 51. 
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(and the remedies available to plaintiffs who prevail) is necessary to 
accomplish Congress’s purpose in implementing ERISA.216 
There is ample legislative history that suggests that Congress intended the 
“landmark reform legislation”217 of ERISA to be broadly construed to achieve 
Congress’s overarching purpose of ensuring that workers enter retirement with 
financial security.218 The Senate Report on ERISA makes this point clear. It 
states, “It is intended that coverage under the Act be construed liberally to 
provide the maximum degree of protection to working men and women 
covered by private retirement programs. Conversely, exemptions should be 
confined to their narrow purpose.”219 With specific regard to ERISA’s 
enforcement provisions, including section 510, the Senate Report also makes it 
clear Congress intended them to be broadly construed. The report notes, “The 
enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to provide both the 
Secretary [of Labor] and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for 
redressing or preventing violations.”220 
In spite of this language indicating that ERISA’s enforcement provisions 
were intended to be broadly construed, the legislative history of ERISA also 
acknowledges that Congress did not intend to impose an undue hardship on 
employers or to discourage employers from providing benefit plans to their 
employees. Specifically, the Senate Report indicates that, while Congress did 
intend to provide additional security for workers’ retirement savings, Congress 
did not intend to do so by imposing rigid requirements on employers. Rather, 
Congress intended to “strike a[] . . . balance between the interests of employers 
and labor organizations in maintaining flexibility in the design and operation of 
their pension programs, and the need of the workers for a level of protection 
which will adequately protect their rights and just expectations.”221 
In light of this legislative history, then, two important points of 
interpretation become apparent. First, ambiguous provisions of ERISA should 
be interpreted in such a way that they further ERISA’s overarching purpose of 
protecting workers from the mismanagement and misuse of the funds they 
have saved for retirement. Second, the interests of employers are also relevant. 
 
 216 See id. at 53. 
 217 S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 35 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4872. 
 218 Id. at 13. 
 219 Id. at 18 (emphasis added). 
 220 Id. at 35. 
 221 Id. at 13. 
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Where possible, ambiguous provisions should also be interpreted in a way that 
gives employers maximum flexibility and minimizes the burden imposed on 
them. 
Applying these principles to section 510, it is apparent that Congress 
intended section 510’s scope to be broad. A broad interpretation of section 
510, particularly the phrase “any inquiry,” best furthers Congress’s purpose of 
protecting workers. Interpreting “any inquiry” broadly results in an expansive 
class of activities that qualify as protected activities, which means more 
employees who report potential ERISA violations have recourse under federal 
law if they face an adverse employment action for making such a report. This 
in turn removes a disincentive for employees to report such violations, which 
makes it more likely that such violations come to light and are corrected, better 
accomplishing Congress’s goal of protecting workers’ retirement savings from 
misuse and mismanagement by pension plan administrators. 
A broad interpretation of the phrase “any inquiry” also furthers Congress’s 
intent to strike a balance between protecting workers’ benefits and minimizing 
the burden imposed on the employer. If “any inquiry” is interpreted to include 
informal, unsolicited complaints to management, then employees who are 
concerned about potential ERISA violations can simply report their concerns 
to management without fear of retaliation. Management can then decide 
whether ERISA violations are actually occurring and can take action to correct 
any violations it discovers. However, if “any inquiry” were interpreted more 
narrowly, employees would be less likely to report potential ERISA violations 
to management for fear of retaliation. For example, under the Fourth Circuit’s 
interpretation, an employee’s complaint must occur within the context of a 
judicial or administrative hearing to be considered a protected activity.222 
Employees who discover potential ERISA violations under this type of 
interpretation would only have two options to avoid potential retaliation: (1) 
ignore the potential ERISA violations and do nothing, which hinders 
Congress’s purpose in passing ERISA; or (2) file a lawsuit or otherwise report 
the potential ERISA violations in the context of a judicial or administrative 
“proceeding,” which exposes the employer to litigation, creates bad publicity 
for the employer, and obstructs Congress’s intent of minimizing the burden 
ERISA imposes on employers. 
 
 222 See King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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This Part has demonstrated that, from a statutory-interpretation perspective, 
the advantages of interpreting section 510 to encompass informal, unsolicited 
complaints to management are threefold. First, such an interpretation remains 
faithful to the provision’s plain text.223 Second, such an interpretation is 
consistent with recent Supreme Court retaliation jurisprudence.224 Finally, a 
broad interpretation of section 510’s scope furthers Congress’s twin aims in 
passing ERISA: (1) providing greater financial security for workers’ retirement 
savings, and (2) promoting flexibility in the way employee benefit plans are 
administered and minimizing the burden imposed on employers.225 Thus, under 
both a textual and a purposive interpretation of the statute, the conclusion is the 
same: properly construed, section 510 is broad enough in scope to encompass 
unsolicited, informal complaints to management, and employees who make 
such complaints and face adverse employment actions in retaliation for doing 
so have a federal cause of action. 
IV.  PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 510 
Part III concluded that interpreting section 510 to encompass informal, 
unsolicited complaints to management is superior from a statutory-
interpretation standpoint. This Part argues that an interpretation of section 510 
that includes these types of complaints is also superior from a practical, policy-
oriented perspective. Section A argues that state law is inadequate to protect 
workers who report violations of ERISA to their supervisors. Section B 
discusses the implications of a broad construction of section 510 in terms of 
ERISA’s broad preemption of state laws. Section C concludes by 
demonstrating that a broad construction of section 510 reverses the perversion 
of incentives that exists under current law by encouraging employees to report 
potential ERISA violations to their supervisors. 
A. Inadequacy of State Law 
A broad interpretation of section 510 means that employees who face an 
adverse employment action because they report potential ERISA violations to 
their supervisors can vindicate their rights in federal court. The fact that 
employees in this situation can sue in federal court is significant in light of the 
varied patchwork of state laws that may or may not give them a state law cause 
 
 223 See supra Part III.A. 
 224 See supra Part III.B. 
 225 See supra Part III.C. 
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of action. As of 2008, only seventeen states had statutes that specifically 
protected private-sector employees from retaliation outside the context of state 
fair-employment-practices statutes.226 These statutes, however, vary 
substantially in terms of how they define what constitutes a protected 
activity.227 Even if such an employee were in a state that had an antiretaliation 
statute, it is very possible that reporting an ERISA violation would not fall 
within the scope of the state statute, and therefore the employee may be left 
unprotected from retaliation by state law.228 
Even in states that do not have laws protecting private-sector employees 
from retaliation for engaging in whistle-blower activities, state tort law may 
provide a remedy for some employees who face an adverse employment action 
because they report potential ERISA violations to management. As of 2008, at 
least forty states permitted whistle-blowers to bring tort actions for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy against their employers.229 Like state 
statutes protecting employees from retaliation, state tort law in this area also 
varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.230 In particular, state tort law 
varies with regard to whether an employee who reports a violation of federal 
law (as opposed to a violation of state law) can pursue a state law cause of 
action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.231 For example, 
some state courts have held that federal law is not a source of the state’s public 
policy and cannot serve as the basis for a claim of wrongful termination in 
 
 226 Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 983 & n.34 
(2008). State fair-employment-practices statutes tend to be similar in terms of the scope of their protection to 
Title VII and thus are typically limited to claims of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, and 
national origin. See id. at 983 n.34. In addition, some state fair-employment-practices statutes protect 
employees from discrimination based on broader characteristics, such as family status, sexual orientation, and 
disability, but fair-employment-practices statutes are not broad enough to encompass retaliation claims by 
ERISA whistle-blowers. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2004) (“All persons shall have the 
opportunity to obtain employment . . . without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, 
ancestry, age, marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, sex or source of lawful income 
used for rental or mortgage payments, subject only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all 
persons.”). 
 227 Moberly, supra note 226, at 983. 
 228 Id. For example, the Arizona Employment Protection Act prohibits employers from terminating 
employees in retaliation for reporting violations of state law, but not of federal law. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 23-1501 (Supp. 2010). By contrast, Connecticut law expressly prohibits employers from terminating 
employees in retaliation for reporting violations of federal law as well as state law. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-
51m(b) (2010); see also Moberly, supra note 226, at 983. 
 229 Moberly, supra note 226, at 983. 
 230 Id. at 984. 
 231 Id. 
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violation of public policy.232 Under this type of analysis, reporting a violation 
of ERISA to management would not give an employee a state law tort claim 
for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.233 In addition, some 
state courts have distinguished between internal complaints about violations of 
law and external complaints about violations of law.234 These courts have 
reasoned that whistle-blowers who make internal complaints have no cause of 
action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, because 
“reporting misconduct internally does not sufficiently advance the public 
interest.”235 In jurisdictions that have adopted either of these doctrines, 
employees who make informal, unsolicited complaints to management 
concerning potential ERISA violations would not have a cause of action under 
state tort law. 
The case of Shirley Edwards, described in the Introduction of this 
Comment, illustrates the potential importance of a broad interpretation of 
section 510 in light of state laws that may inadequately protect employees who 
make unsolicited complaints to management about potential ERISA violations. 
After the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Edwards’s 
claim under section 510, Edwards’s only alternative would be to sue in state 
court under Pennsylvania law. Unfortunately for Edwards, Pennsylvania’s 
whistle-blower statute only applies to public-sector employees.236 
Pennsylvania tort law also does not provide Edwards a cause of action for 
wrongful termination under these circumstances. Although Pennsylvania 
common law recognizes a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of 
public policy,237 Pennsylvania law presupposes an “extremely strong” 
presumption of at-will employment, allowing wrongful discharge claims in 
only “the most limited of circumstances.”238 As a general matter, Pennsylvania 
law does not recognize a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy when an employee is terminated in retaliation for reporting a violation 
 
 232 Id. 
 233 See id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1422 (2010). The Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law defines an “employee” as 
“[a] person who performs a service for wages or other remuneration under a contract of hire, written or oral, 
express or implied, for a public body.” Id. (emphasis added). The definition of “public body” excludes private-
sector companies that do not receive government funding. Id. Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Whistleblower 
Law does not protect Edwards because she is not considered an employee within the meaning of the statute. 
 237 See Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974). 
 238 McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 750 A.2d 283, 287 (Pa. 2000). 
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of a federal statute.239 That is, an employee only has a claim for wrongful 
discharge in violation of public policy under Pennsylvania law if the 
employee’s termination violates a public policy of Pennsylvania, as embodied 
in the Pennsylvania constitution, state statutes, and decisions of Pennsylvania 
state courts.240 Under the current law, then, Shirley Edwards is out of a job and 
without a remedy under either state or federal law.241 And Edwards’s employer 
(and supervisor) escapes unscathed. 
B. Implications of Preemption of State Law 
The interpretation this Comment proposes has another consequence with 
regard to state law in light of ERISA’s broad preemption of state laws. Section 
514(a) states that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” subject to regulation 
under ERISA.242 The Supreme Court has interpreted section 514(a) as very 
expansive, stating in one decision that it “is conspicuous for its breadth.”243 
Within the specific context of section 510, the Supreme Court has also 
interpreted the preemptive effect of ERISA very broadly, holding that, 
“‘[w]hen it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State 
purports to regulate are protected’ by § 510 . . . ‘due regard for the federal 
enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield.’”244 It comes as no 
surprise, therefore, that every circuit court of appeals concluding that informal, 
unsolicited complaints to management fall within the scope of section 510 has 
 
 239 See id. at 289 (“[T]o set forth a claim for wrongful discharge a Plaintiff must do more than show a 
possible violation of a federal statute that implicates only her own personal interest.”). 
 240 Id. 
 241 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has arguably left the door open to allowing a state tort law claim 
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy even when the public policy is embodied in a federal 
statute if the federal courts do not provide an adequate forum for vindicating the employee’s rights. See id. at 
290 (suggesting that whether “the federal scheme provides for an administrative forum” may be a relevant 
factor in the analysis); see also Carlson v. Cmty. Ambulance Servs., Inc., 824 A.2d 1228, 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2003) (noting that the federal statute did not “permanently foreclose[] litigation” in affirming summary 
judgment in favor of the employer). But see Weaver v. Harpster, 975 A.2d 555, 569 (Pa. 2009) (holding that a 
state or federal statute that provides a remedy for wrongful termination only in limited circumstances cannot 
provide a basis for a tort claim for wrongful discharge against public policy when the statute itself does not 
apply). The Pennsylvania courts have not considered the specific question of whether section 510, in light of 
the Third Circuit’s decision in Edwards, could provide the basis for a state law claim of wrongful discharge in 
violation of public policy. Whether such a claim is cognizable is unclear. It is very possible (perhaps likely) 
that Edwards would have no state law remedy. 
 242 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
 243 FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990). 
 244 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990) (first alteration in original) (quoting 
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409 n.8 (1988)). 
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also concluded that section 510 preempts any state law remedy for retaliation, 
whether that remedy arises under a state statute or under state tort law.245 Thus, 
although the interpretation this Comment proposes succeeds in opening the 
door to the federal courthouse to some employees who otherwise would have 
no remedy under either federal or state law, it has the additional effect of 
closing the door to the state courts for other employees who currently would 
have causes of action under state (but not federal) law. 
This shift from state law claims to federal law claims may have some 
important implications with regard to the range of remedies available to a 
plaintiff who prevails on her cause of action under section 510. The remedies 
provision of section 502(a)(3) allows a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary of 
a benefit plan covered by ERISA who prevails on a claim under section 510 to 
obtain two types of relief: (1) an injunction preventing future violations of 
ERISA or the terms of the plan and (2) “other appropriate equitable relief (i) to 
redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or 
the terms of the plan.”246 The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to 
permit plaintiffs who prevail on a cause of action under section 510 to recover 
only “those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as 
injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages).”247 
Consequently, to the extent that state law may allow plaintiffs who prevail on a 
state law retaliation claim to recover compensatory damages, the potential 
recovery for plaintiffs may be less under the interpretation of section 510 this 
Comment proposes (as opposed to interpreting section 510 in such a way that 
informal, unsolicited complaints to management about potential ERISA 
violations fall outside its scope).248 
More problematically for plaintiffs, however, is the fact that at least one 
circuit court of appeals has interpreted section 502(a)(3) as precluding 
plaintiffs who prevail on a cause of action under section 510 from recovering 
backpay.249 The court reasoned that backpay is legal relief akin to 
compensatory damages and therefore is precluded by the plain text of section 
 
 245 See, e.g., Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that ERISA 
section 510 preempts a state cause of action for wrongful discharge); Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 
408, 412 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA section 510 preempts the Hawaii Whistle Blower’s Act). 
 246 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B). 
 247 Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). 
 248 For example, the Delaware Whistleblowers’ Protection Act allows employees who prevail on 
retaliation claims to recover “actual damages” in addition to backpay and other equitable relief. DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 19, § 1704 (2010). 
 249 See Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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502(a)(3).250 At least one commentator, however, has persuasively argued that 
this decision is inconsistent with the treatment of backpay under Title VII, the 
National Labor Relations Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the FLSA, which 
universally treat backpay as an equitable remedy, not a legal remedy.251 This 
commentator also convincingly argues that permitting backpay as a remedy 
better comports with congressional intent, and suggests that the case holding 
otherwise was incorrectly decided.252 Whether backpay ultimately should be 
available as a remedy under section 502(a)(3), however, is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. Suffice it to say that it is an open question, and it is at least 
conceivable that the interpretation of section 510 this Comment proposes 
would make it impossible for some plaintiffs who prevail to recover backpay, 
even though state law may give them that remedy if section 510 were 
interpreted differently.253 
C. Reversing the Perversion of Incentives 
In spite of this preemption issue, under the current law, the fact remains 
that people like Shirley Edwards have no remedy under either federal or state 
law. This Comment’s proposed interpretation of section 510 ensures that all 
employees who face adverse employment actions in retaliation for reporting 
potential ERISA violations to management will at least be able to sue for 
equitable relief and get an injunction giving them their jobs back if they 
prevail.254 
While a narrow interpretation of section 510 may discourage employees 
from reporting potential ERISA violations to management and frustrate 
Congress’s overarching objective of ensuring that workers’ retirement savings 
are protected, a broad interpretation of section 510, such as the one proposed in 
this Comment, would open the doors of the federal courts to people like 
Edwards, who, under the existing law, have no remedy under either federal or 
state law. As a consequence, they would be more likely to report potential 
ERISA violations to their managers because they would be entitled to relief 
under federal law if their employers retaliated against them. 
 
 250 Id. at 1253. 
 251 Barclay-Strobel, supra note 15, at 561–62. 
 252 Id. at 567. 
 253 See, e.g., tit. 19, § 1704 (expressly allowing backpay as a remedy). 
 254 See supra note 246. 
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In addition to opening the doors to the federal courthouses, this Comment’s 
proposed interpretation of section 510 has the practical advantage of 
eliminating the perverse incentives for both employers255 and employees256 
created by current judicial interpretations of section 510. This interpretation 
eliminates the incentive for employers not to investigate or follow-up on 
complaints initiated by employees because, unlike the approach the Second 
Circuit took in Nicolaou, it does not define whether an “inquiry” has occurred 
by reference to what types of actions the employer took in response to the 
employee’s complaint.257 That is, an employee’s informal, unsolicited 
complaint to management is still an “inquiry”, even if the employer does not 
ask the employee any questions or further investigate the employee’s 
complaint.258 If the employer then commits an adverse employment action 
against the complaining employee, the employer has violated section 510, even 
if the employer took no action to investigate the employee’s complaint.259 
Similarly, this Comment’s proposed interpretation removes the incentive 
for employees to make their complaints only in the context of a judicial or 
administrative “proceeding.” That is, under this Comment’s proposed 
interpretation, an “inquiry” may occur even when the employee makes an 
informal, unsolicited complaint to management.260 The employee receives the 
same protection from an adverse employment action regardless of whether she 
makes an informal complaint to management or makes a complaint in the 
context of a more formal setting, such as a judicial or administrative 
“proceeding.” This contrasts with the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation in King, 
which requires that an employee make her complaint within the context of a 
judicial or administrative “proceeding” to have any recourse under federal law 
if her employer takes a retaliatory adverse employment action against her.261 
Under the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation, an informed employee will only 
report potential ERISA violations within the context of a formal judicial or 
administrative “proceeding.” By contrast, the broad interpretation developed 
by this Comment preserves an employee’s cause of action for retaliation, even 
if she makes an unsolicited, informal complaint to management. Not only is an 
 
 255 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 256 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 257 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 258 See supra Part III.A. 
 259 See supra Part III. 
 260 See supra Part III. 
 261 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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informal complaint to management less burdensome on the employee than 
instituting a lawsuit or a “proceeding” before an administrative agency, it also 
means more potential ERISA violations will be reported. In addition, 
businesses could potentially face fewer lawsuits and reduce their liability for 
ERISA violations, because they could promptly correct any actual ERISA 
violations employees’ complaints brought to light. Accordingly, this 
Comment’s interpretation of section 510 better accomplishes the twin aims 
Congress intended when it passed ERISA: maximizing the protection of 
workers’ retirement savings while minimizing the burden on employers.262 
CONCLUSION 
Current judicial interpretations of section 510 have been inadequate as a 
matter of statutory interpretation and from a policy perspective. Interpretations 
concluding that informal, unsolicited complaints to management fall outside 
the scope of section 510 have focused only on the text of the statute without 
considering congressional intent or purpose. Interpretations concluding that 
informal, unsolicited complaints to management are within the scope of section 
510 have focused solely on congressional intent and purpose, and have ignored 
section 510’s plain text. This Comment proposes an interpretation of section 
510 that bridges the gap between these two existing approaches. This 
interpretation is grounded in section 510’s plain text and also furthers 
Congress’s intent. 
The interpretation this Comment proposes has several advantages over 
current judicial approaches. First, it eliminates perverse incentives that exist 
for both employers and employees under the current law and better 
accomplishes Congress’s twin aims in implementing ERISA of maximizing 
security of employees’ retirement savings while minimizing the burden 
imposed on employers. Second, it allows employees who have no cause of 
action under state law to pursue their claims in federal court, thereby ensuring 
that all employees who are fired in retaliation for making informal, unsolicited 
complaints to management concerning potential ERISA violations have an 
opportunity to vindicate their rights in court. 
In the final analysis, a broad interpretation of section 510 has practical 
advantages for both employers and whistle-blower employees. Whistle-blower 
employees benefit because they can report any concerns that their employers 
 
 262 See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
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are violating ERISA directly to their managers without fear of losing their jobs 
and being left without a remedy. At the same time, employers benefit because 
employees will be more inclined to go directly to management with any 
questions about whether the employer’s practices violate ERISA, minimizing 
the employer’s exposure to costly litigation. Perhaps the biggest beneficiaries 
of a broad interpretation of section 510 are workers who have trusted their 
employers with their retirement savings. After all, section 510 “is the linchpin 
of the whole matrix of federal pension and welfare benefit protections.”263 It is 
the foundation upon which the whole system designed to protect workers’ 
retirement savings rests. The interpretation this Comment proposes strengthens 
this foundation. As a result, workers can rest assured they will not be denied 
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